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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2006, US courts have been developing a body of case 
law that interprets Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
(“Chapter 15”).1 Chapter 15, enacted as part of the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(BAPCA), grants US courts jurisdiction to recognize a non-US 
bankruptcy proceeding and provide effect to that bankruptcy.2 
Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency3 (“Model Law”), promulgated by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which 
offers a worldwide framework for coordinating international 
insolvencies.4 As the United States’ expression of the Model 
Law, Chapter 15 incorporates US policies on cross-border 
insolvency.5 
Chapter 15 case law is still in its infancy.6 Since its 
enactment, less than 200 Chapter 15 cases have been filed.7 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32 (2006). 
2. Id. 
3. Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998) 
[hereinafter Model Law]. 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (stating that the purpose of Chapter 15 is to incorporate 
the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency (“Model Law”) into US law). An international or cross-border 
insolvency takes place when a debtor in bankruptcy has assets in more than one 
country and, therefore, the laws of two or more countries are implicated in the 
insolvency. See CARL FELSENFELD, FELSENFELD ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 1–5 
(2003); Gerald I. Lies, Sale of a Business in Cross-Border Insolvency: The United States and 
Germany, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363, 390 (2002). The terms “international 
insolvency” and “cross-border insolvency” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Comment to refer to a bankruptcy that implicates the laws of more than one nation. 
5. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532. 
6. See, e.g., Selinda A. Melnik, United States, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 265, 324 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed. 
2009) (listing fewer than twenty significant Chapter 15 decisions through mid-2009); 
Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts, http://www.uncitral.org/clout/searchDocument.
do;jsessionid=1687EC111D1E22A697667C4002159744.cl013 (last visited Aug. 4, 2011) 
(showing fewer than thirty-five US cases on this database, which compiles important 
case law interpreting enacted versions of the Model Law). 
7. See Melnik, supra note 6, at 305–23; cf. Business and Nonbusiness Cases 
Commenced by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (follow “12-month period ending in December” for 
relevant charts) (last visited June 2, 2011) (failing to provide statistics for the number 
of Chapter 15 cases filed in 2009 and 2010, while providing statistics on the number of 
cases filed under other chapters of the US Bankruptcy Code). 
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Additionally, it was not until Fogerty v. Petroquest (In re Condor Ins. 
Ltd.) (“Condor”) that US courts had the opportunity to rule on 
the law governing avoidance actions8 under this provision of the 
US Bankruptcy Code.9 
In 2007, liquidators of Condor Insurance Limited 
(“Condor Insurance”), declared bankruptcy in St. Kitts & Nevis 
and thereafter petitioned for recognition of that insolvency in 
the United States under Chapter 15.10 Condor Insurance’s 
liquidators then commenced an avoidance action in the United 
States under St. Kitts & Nevis law to avoid an alleged fraudulent 
transfer made by Condor Insurance to its US subsidiary.11 
Whether Condor Insurance could commence an avoidance 
action via Chapter 15 as opposed to in connection with a 
plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code was debated before the lower courts.12 In 2010, 
the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued a final 
decision on the matter, ruling that pursuant to § 1521 of 
Chapter 15, US courts have authority to permit avoidance 
actions via Chapter 15 under the law governing the main 
insolvency case.13 
As a case of first impression, Condor provides some authority 
on how avoidance actions function under Chapter 15.14 Yet, 
whether avoidance actions may be brought via Chapter 15 and 
whether US courts should unwaveringly defer to non-US 
                                                                                                                                                                     
8. Avoidance actions permit a debtor or the representative of a debtor’s estate to 
recover assets that were transferred out of the debtor’s estate prior to or during its 
insolvency for the benefit of the debtor’s general body of creditors. See infra Part I.A 
(defining avoidance actions). 
9. See In re Atlas Shipping, 404 B.R. 726, 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining 
that Condor was the first case to discuss the avoidance carve-out under Chapter 15); 
Fogerty v. Petroquest Res., Inc. (In re Condor), 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010). 
10. See infra Part II.A (discussing Condor’s procedural history). 
11. See infra Part II.A. 
12. See infra Part II.A. 
13. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s holding and rationale). 
14. See, e.g., In re Int’l Banking Corp. B.S.C., 439 B.R. 614, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (citing Condor for the proposition that US courts have authority to handle 
avoidance actions under non-US law via Chapter 15); Decl. of Stewart Hey as 
Representative of Charles Russell, LLP, London, as External Adm’r of Awal Bank, 
B.S.C., In Administration, in Supp. of Chapter 11 Pet. and Related Mot. for Relief, In re 
Awal Bank, BSC, Nos. 09-15923 (Chapter 15 case) and 10-15518 (Chapter 11 case) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (showing that following Condor, a non-US representative filed a 
plenary proceeding for the purpose of commencing avoidance actions in the United 
States). 
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avoidance law is debatable.15 Condor presented the unique 
circumstance that a non-US insurance company sought 
recognition under Chapter 15 and the authority to commence 
an avoidance action.16 US law, however, prohibits insurance 
companies from filing for insolvency and commencing 
avoidance actions under federal law, including under Chapter 7 
or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.17 Rather than fashion an 
exception for insurance companies under Chapter 15 or suggest 
that Condor Insurance seek relief under state law, Condor 
instead broadly interpreted Chapter 15’s avoidance provisions in 
a way that is not consistent with Chapter 15’s legislative history 
or with the Model Law.18 
As a result, this decision proposes to arm all non-US 
insolvency representatives with the right to proceed with an 
avoidance action under Chapter 15.19 Chapter 15, though, is 
currently not an independent vehicle for avoidance actions.20 
Condor also promotes unwavering deference to the avoidance 
law governing the main insolvency case.21 Support for this 
choice of law rule, however, is also not found in Chapter 15’s 
legislative history.22 
Going forward, US courts should not rely on Condor’s 
interpretation of Chapter 15’s avoidance provisions. To defend 
this view and to clarify the avoidance rules under Chapter 15, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
15. See infra Part I.E (explaining that § 1523 is the only appropriate vehicle for 
avoidance actions under Chapter 15 and showing that pursuant to this section, an 
avoidance action brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case may be under US or 
non-US avoidance law, and discussing how In re Maxwell, the seminal US case on 
choice of law in avoidance actions under the former US law states that courts should 
engage in a choice of law analysis before determining whether to apply US or non-US 
avoidance law in this context). 
16. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing Condor Insurance’s status as an insurer and 
explaining that non-US insurance companies do not have access to Chapter 7 or 11). 
17. See infra note 124 (explaining that insurance companies cannot file for 
bankruptcy under federal law). 
18. See infra Part II.B (explaining Condor’s rationale); infra Part III.A (discussing 
how Condor misinterpreted the purpose of the avoidance rules under Chapter 15). 
19. See infra Part II.B (discussing Condor’s holding). 
20. See infra Part I.E (explaining that avoidance actions related to a Chapter 15 
case must be commenced through a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code). 
21. See infra Part II.B (discussing Condor’s conclusions about when it is 
appropriate to apply US or non-US avoidance law). 
22. See infra Part I.E (explaining the role of US choice of law principles in 
avoidance actions brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case). 
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this Comment proceeds in three parts.23 Part I examines 
Chapter 15’s origins, providing the context for and history of 
Chapter 15’s avoidance rules. Part II explains the Condor case, 
including the Fifth Circuit’s rationale and holding. Part III 
critiques Condor and concludes that avoidance actions may not 
be commenced in connection with a Chapter 15 case outside of 
a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code. It explains that US courts should not 
unwaveringly defer to non-US avoidance law without engaging 
in a choice of law analysis. Finally, it asserts that Condor’s 
characterization of Chapter 15 is inconsistent with US policies 
and therefore with the spirit of Chapter 15. 
I. CHAPTER 15 AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 
Chapter 15’s avoidance provision had many influences in its 
drafting stage. Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law, which in 
turn was based on the European Union Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings (“EU Regulation”).24 Since former § 304 
of the US Bankruptcy Code (“§ 304”) preceded Chapter 15, it 
also remains relevant to Chapter 15’s legislative history.25 Section 
304, however, is applicable to Chapter 15 only to the extent that 
it does not contradict Chapter 15.26 This is because Chapter 15 is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
23. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this Comment, the term “insolvency 
representative” will be used to refer to the representative of a debtor’s estate, even 
though under US law, the appropriate term may be a “debtor in possession” or a 
“trustee,” depending on the circumstances, and under European Union (“EU”) law, 
the appropriate term is “administrator.” See Edward J. Janger, Virtual Territoriality, 48 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 401, 414–15 (2010); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of 
Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 502 n.14 (1991). 
Moreover, throughout this Comment, the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” will be 
used interchangeably, even though they have different meanings in different countries. 
The term “bankruptcy” in the United States describes a system for managing general 
default of both consumers and corporations, whereas in England, for example, it often 
refers only to individuals in bankruptcy while “insolvency” refers to business 
bankruptcies. See RICHARD E. BAINES, DOING BUSINESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
§ 15.01(2) (Matthew Bender ed., 2008) (elaborating on the difference between these 
terms); Westbrook, supra at 502 n.14 (asserting that the terms bankruptcy and insolvency 
have a different meaning in the United States and in other countries). 
24. Council Regulation No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. 
L 160/1 [hereinafter EU Regulation]. 
25. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115 (2005) (explaining that Chapter 15 
replaces § 304). 
26. See infra note 91 (discussing the limited role of § 304 under Chapter 15). 
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a departure from the United States’ previous approach to cross-
border insolvency under § 304.27 
To understand Chapter 15’s avoidance provision, it is 
essential to examine these influences. This Part, therefore, 
presents an overview of how the EU Regulation, the Model Law, 
and § 304 influenced Chapter 15. Part I.A introduces the 
concept of avoidance actions. Part I.B summarizes the theories 
of international insolvency, which provide a paradigm for 
coordinating international insolvencies. Part I.C examines how 
the EU Regulation is structured and, in particular, how it 
provides for avoidance relief. Part I.D discusses the purpose of 
the Model Law and the avoidance provision therein. Part I.E 
explains the United States’ approach towards cross-border 
insolvencies, initially under § 304, now under Chapter 15. It 
specifically examines Chapter 15 §§ 1521 and 1523, which 
address avoidance actions. 
A. AVOIDANCE ACTIONS 
When an entity files for or is placed in insolvency, the 
debtor or an insolvency representative for its estate may 
commence an avoidance action to collect assets that the debtor 
fraudulently transferred out of its estate, often to place them 
beyond the reach of the debtor’s creditors.28 Avoiding such 
transfers protects the interests of the debtor’s general body of 
creditors by maximizing the assets in the debtor’s estate, placing 
creditors in a favorable position to recover on their claims.29 
                                                                                                                                                                     
27. See infra Part I.E (discussing § 304 and Chapter 15 and showing that while 
§ 304 permitted courts to grant any appropriate relief to non-US insolvencies based on 
a few enumerated principles, Chapter 15 is a much more detailed statute that specifies 
the procedure for obtaining various forms of insolvency relief). 
28. See PHILIP R. WOOD, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 72 (1995) 
(stating that sophisticated bankruptcy laws worldwide permit insolvency representatives 
to pursue avoidance actions to undo transfers by the debtor in the twilight period or in 
order to prevent fraud); Westbrook, supra note 23, at 504–05 (asserting that most 
countries allow avoidance actions to remedy fraud, but also have preference laws, which 
allow transfers for less than equivalent value to be avoided). 
29. See 8A C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 666 (2011) (explaining that post-petition avoidance 
actions prevent debtors from exhausting available resources before creditors have the 
opportunity to access them); WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 3D DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY TERMS, § A160 (2011) (stating that pre-
petition avoidance actions benefit creditors because property is recovered for the 
entire estate). 
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Thus, at its core, avoidance actions adjust or nullify transfers by 
the debtor and subsequently reorder or redistribute the 
recovered assets equitably among creditors.30 
Avoidance laws often vary by country. As such, each legal 
system may provide different reach-back periods in which a 
transfer may be recovered, prescribe varying circumstances 
under which these actions may be commenced, and include 
unique redistribution priorities that reflect a nation’s public 
policies.31 When an entity files for or is placed into bankruptcy 
in one country and seeks to avoid a transfer in another country, 
determining which law should govern the action—the avoidance 
law of the primary insolvency case, or the avoidance law of the 
place of transfer—presents a choice of law dilemma.32 In 
addition, determining where to commence such an avoidance 
action is an issue that has to be addressed when structuring a 
cross-border insolvency regime.33 
                                                                                                                                                                     
30. See Brendan Mockler, Chapter 15 Choice of Avoidance Law in a U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court: Is It Really a Choice?, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW Part I, art. 
11 (2009) (asserting that the main goal of an avoidance action is to reallocate a 
debtor’s assets according to public policy priorities as laid out by statute); Westbrook, 
supra note 23, at 508 (clarifying that avoidance laws restructure the way a debtor’s assets 
have been allocated by replacing debtor-creditor actions with actions as prioritized by 
statute). 
31. For example, St. Kitts and Nevis’ fraudulent transfer laws provide for a reach-
back period of up to ten years. See Laws of Saint Christopher and Nevis, Ch. 9, ¶ 44. In 
contrast, US fraudulent transfer law has a reach-back period of two years. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)–(b) (2006); see also Mockler, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that some 
countries consider state of mind a relevant factor in making avoidance determinations, 
while others do not); Paul J. Omar, The Internationalisation of Insolvency Law: An Anglo-
French Comparison, 39 INT’L L. 107, 119 (2005) (stating that France’s avoidance laws 
favor employees over other creditors). 
32. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY 
LAW, 67, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE] (“Where 
insolvency proceedings involve parties or assets located in different States, complex 
questions may arise as to the law that will apply to questions of validity and effectiveness 
of rights in those assets or of other claims; and to the treatment of those assets and of 
the rights and claims of those foreign parties in the insolvency proceedings.”); 
Westbrook, supra note 23, at 499 (explaining that multinational companies usually 
engage in substantial pre-bankruptcy transfers in other countries and that this forces 
courts to determine which law should govern). 
33. See infra Part I.B (explaining that both choice of forum and law issues are 
present in cross-border insolvencies). 
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B. INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PARADIGMS 
There are two dominant theories about how to administer 
cross-border insolvencies: territorialism and universalism.34 
Under territorialism, if a debtor with assets in more than one 
country files for insolvency, each country where the debtor’s 
assets are located administers those assets pursuant to its local 
laws.35 As a result, separate administration, filing, and evaluation 
of creditors’ claims take place in multiple jurisdictions and are 
governed by varying laws.36 Universalism, on the other hand, 
provides that the forum where the insolvency petition is filed, 
and its substantive law, will govern the distribution of a debtor’s 
assets worldwide.37 This regime treats all similarly situated 
creditors equitably and, in its purest form, does not vary the 
rights of interested parties based on their physical location.38 
                                                                                                                                                                     
34. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border 
Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43, 47 (2008) 
(stating that universalism and territorialism are the “two main theories” on structuring 
cross-border insolvency proceedings); Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are 
Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 105, 108 (2005) (stating that 
universalism and territorialism are the “two dominant theories” on structuring cross-
border insolvency proceedings). 
35. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 742 (1999) (explaining that 
territorialism describes a system in which each country controls the distribution of 
assets within its own territory and allows other countries to do likewise); Westbrook, supra 
note 23, at 513 (describing territorialism as the “Grab Rule” because, in response to a 
bankruptcy, the courts of each country where a debtor’s property is located “grab” the 
property located therein and distribute it according to its local laws). 
36. See Bufford, supra note 34, at 114 (explaining that with territorialism each 
jurisdiction carries out its own administration, filing, evaluation, and prosecution of the 
debtor’s estate); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2309 (2000) (stating that territorialism is time consuming for 
courts and insolvency representatives because creditor claims, estate administration, 
and actions occur simultaneously in multiple jurisdiction where the debtor has 
property). 
37. See LoPucki, supra note 35, at 705 (asserting that universalism is a system in 
which a single court handles the administration and distribution of a debtor’s assets 
worldwide); Westbrook, supra note 23, at 514 (explaining that under universalism, a 
single forum applies a single legal regime to all of the debtor’s affairs worldwide). 
38. See Bufford, supra note 34, at 110 (stating that because a single legal regime 
governs in universalism, conflicts regarding applicable law, which could vary the rights 
of interested parties, are eliminated); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism 
in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 466 
(1991) (clarifying that universalism “make[s] unequal distributions somewhat less 
unequal”). 
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Tempered versions of these frameworks, known as modified 
universalism and cooperative territorialism, provide less extreme 
paradigms for conducting cross-border insolvencies. 
Cooperative territorialism envisions multiple full-scale 
insolvencies in countries administering local assets, but also calls 
for cooperation through communication by courts 
administering a debtor’s assets.39 Modified universalism 
conceives of a primary insolvency case with multiple ancillary 
cases to assist in implementing the decisions of the main 
proceeding.40 The primary difference between these two systems 
is that modified universalism accords greater credence to the 
laws governing the main insolvency case than does cooperative 
territorialism.41 Modified universalism is currently the most 
widely accepted, and it is embodied in the EU Regulation and in 
the Model Law—the two most comprehensive international 
insolvency regimes in effect today.42 
                                                                                                                                                                     
39. See Janger, supra note 23, at 406–07 (explaining that courts in different 
countries will communicate in cooperative territorialism). 
40. See Adams & Fincke, supra note 34, at 48 (asserting that modified 
universalism permits a “non-home country” or “non-main” court to open a secondary 
insolvency case to supplement the “main” or “home country’s” dominant case); 
Bufford, supra note 34, at 112 (stating that modified universalism recognizes that a 
main insolvency proceeding may require support through ancillary proceedings in 
other countries where the debtor’s assets are located or where local support is 
otherwise needed to effectively carry out the objectives of the insolvency). 
41. See Janger, supra note 23, at 406–07 (showing that modified universalism calls 
for the supremacy of the law where the main proceeding is pending whereas 
cooperative territorialism imagines bankruptcies in multiple jurisdictions governed by 
varying laws, coordinated only by communication between states); Paul L. Lee, Ancillary 
Proceedings under Section 304 and Proposed Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 76 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 115, 122–23 (2002) (explaining that in cooperative territorialism courts 
usually defers to local law in ancillary bankruptcy proceedings); Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 573 (1996) 
(stating that cooperative territorialism provides less deference to a main proceeding 
than does modified universalism). 
42. See Fernando Locatelli, International Trade and Insolvency Law: Is the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency an Answer for Brazil? (An Economic 
Analysis of its Benefits on International Trade), 14 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 313, 318 (2008) 
(asserting that most countries have moved away from territorialism and universalism 
towards the more sophisticated “modified universalism”); Janis Sarra, Oversight and 
Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency Proceedings, 44 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 547, 553 (2009) (explaining that while most jurisdictions used to be territorial in 
their approach to cross-border insolvencies, modified universalism has become more 
prevalent, as it represents a compromise to advance cooperation amongst nations). 
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C. EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION 
In 1996, the EU Regulation was promulgated to harmonize 
insolvency proceedings among Member States of the European 
Union (“EU”).43 Under the EU Regulation, there is a primary 
insolvency proceeding, called a main proceeding, and it must be 
commenced in the Member State of the debtor’s Center of Main 
Interests (“COMI”).44 The COMI is the place where the debtor 
regularly administers its affairs in a manner ascertainable to 
third parties and is presumptively a debtor’s place of 
incorporation.45 To ensure that the insolvency is commenced in 
the appropriate jurisdiction, prior to opening proceedings, the 
Member State in which relief is being sought must determine 
the location of a debtor’s COMI.46 Once a main proceeding is 
opened in the appropriate jurisdiction, Member States must 
automatically recognize that insolvency and the jurisdiction of 
the Member State governing its proceeding.47 Thereafter, all 
                                                                                                                                                                     
43. Roland Lechner, Waking from the Jurisdictional Nightmare of Multinational 
Default: The European Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 975, 978 (2002) (showing that the EU Regulation was first adopted in 1996, 
and revised in 2000); see also EU Regulation, supra note 24. 
44. See EU Regulation, supra note 24, art. 3(1), at 5 (“The courts of the Member 
State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated 
shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.”). 
45. Id. pmbl. 13, at 2 (“The [COMI]” should correspond to the place where the 
debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore 
ascertainable by third parties.”). See generally Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., Case C-341/04, 
[2006] E.C.R. I-03813 (explaining that a debtor’s COMI is presumptively its place of 
incorporation). 
46. Cour d’appel [CA] [Court of Appeal], Versailles, Dec. 15, 2005, I.L.Pr. 2006, 
32, 681, Besse (Fr.) (“It is correct that the French courts must check that the court of a 
Member State has established that it has jurisdiction in its decision to open main 
insolvency proceedings; this jurisdiction is dependent upon the centre of main 
interests of the company being situated within the jurisdiction of the court hearing the 
case.”). Indeed, much litigation has resulted from disputes over where a debtor’s 
COMI is located. See, e.g., Eurofood [2006] E.C.R. I-03813, ¶ 24 (addressing whether an 
Irish subsidiary of an Italian holding company should commence insolvency 
proceedings in Ireland or in Italy and examining the factors that determine a debtor’s 
COMI). 
47. See Cour d’appel [CA][Court of Appeal], Versailles, Sept. 4, 2003, B.C.C. 
2003, 984, Besse (Fr.); Eurofood [2005] E.C.R. I-3813, ¶ 103 (discussing the obligations 
of Member States once a main insolvency proceeding has been commenced, the court 
notes that “[s]tates may not review the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin, 
but only verify that the judgment emanates from a court of a Contracting State which 
claims jurisdiction under Article 3 [comity] and is accepted by numerous 
commentators.”). Under the EU Regulation, whether a proceeding was opened in the 
appropriate country, i.e., the debtor’s COMI, as a threshold matter, is the only issue 
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other EU proceedings relating to that insolvency are 
automatically ancillary to the main proceeding, and are called 
secondary proceedings.48 
Pursuant to Article 4 of the EU Regulation, the law of the 
COMI continues to govern fundamental aspects of that entity’s 
bankruptcy throughout the EU, including the choice of which 
avoidance law will control.49 Recognizing that Member States 
make policy choices in fashioning their local avoidance laws, the 
EU Regulation calls for displacing the COMI’s law in avoidance 
actions, despite the deference afforded to the law of a debtor’s 
COMI in Article 4.50 
If a non-COMI Member State opens an avoidance action 
related to a COMI proceeding, EU Regulation Article 13 
controls and provides that the law of the debtor’s COMI will 
govern the avoidance action only if the transfer would be 
avoidable under both the COMI’s law and the law of the 
Member State where the avoidance action is taking place.51 
                                                                                                                                                                     
reviewable by the courts of Member States, with the other exception that courts of 
Member States may review whether recognizing a “foreign” insolvency is manifestly 
contrary to the recognizing Member States’ public policy. See id. 
48. EU Regulation, supra note 24, art. 3(3), at 5 (“Where insolvency proceedings 
have been opened under paragraph 1 [in a debtor’s COMI], any proceedings opened 
subsequently . . . shall be secondary proceedings . . . .”). 
49. See id. art. 4(2)(m), at 6 (providing that the law governing the debtor’s COMI 
shall determine various forms of relief including “rules relating to the voidness, 
voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors”); Adam 
Gallagher, Center of Main Interest: The EU Insolvency Regulation and Chapter 15, 28-6 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 44, 45 (2009) (explaining that the law governing the debtor’s COMI 
determines, in large part, the parameters of any EU restructuring); Nigel John 
Howcroft, Universal vs. Territorial Models for Cross-Border Insolvency: The Theory, The 
Practice, and The Reality That Universalism Prevails, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 366, 414–15 
(2008) (stating that the law governing a debtor’s COMI determines such matters as 
distribution of assets and the rights of debtors and creditors in an EU insolvency). 
50. See EU Regulation, supra note 24, art. 13, at 7 (asserting that the COMI’s law 
will not govern if proof is provided that “the act is subject to the law of a Member State 
other than that of the State of the opening of proceedings, and that law does not allow 
any means of challenging that act in the relevant case.”); Miguel Virgos & Etienne 
Schmit, Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, EU Council Doc. 6500/96, 
¶ 138, at 89 (May 3, 1996) (explaining that the goal of Article 13 is to displace the 
avoidance law of the debtor’s COMI in favor of the law of the forum where the 
avoidance action is being commenced and discussing that this rule upholds the 
legitimate expectations of creditors or third-parties, and preserves local Member States’ 
interests). 
51. See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: 
Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 119, 128 (1998) (stating that Article 13 
displaces the avoidance law of the debtor’s COMI under certain circumstances); Virgos 
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Thus, there are circumstances in an EU insolvency in which the 
law of the debtor’s COMI will not govern an avoidance action.52 
The EU Regulation accordingly provides jurisdictional mandates 
regarding insolvency amongst Member States and resolves 
choice of law issues in EU cross-border avoidance actions.53 
D. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 
In 1998, UNCITRAL published the Model Law, using the 
EU Regulation as its guide.54 Both common and civil law 
countries participated in formulating its principles.55 The 
purpose of the Model Law is to suggest a method for 
streamlining cross-border insolvency among nations.56 It 
presents a model law for countries to fashion similar cross-
                                                                                                                                                                     
& Schmit, supra note 50, ¶¶ 136–37, at 88 (explaining that the only purpose of Article 
13 of the EU Regulation is to reject the law of the debtor’s COMI). The COMI’s law, 
for example, will not control a contract subject to the laws of another Member State. 
See id. Also, the COMI’s law will not trump the laws of another Member State when the 
laws of that other Member State would not, for example, permit a certain transfer to be 
challenged either under that Member States’ insolvency rules or under its other 
applicable laws. See id. 
52. Virgos & Schmit, supra note 50, ¶¶ 136–37, at 88 (explaining that the 
avoidance law of a debtor’s COMI will not always govern in a cross border insolvency in 
the EU). 
53. See EU Regulation, supra note 24, pmbl. 23, at 3 (“This Regulation should set 
out, for the matters covered by it, uniform rules on conflict of laws which replace, 
within their scope of application, national rules of private international law . . . .”). 
54. See André J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A 
Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 320 (1998) (stating that the EU 
Regulation was a source of inspiration for the drafters of the Model Law); Robert E. 
Cortes et al., Cross-Border Insolvencies and Chapter 15: Recent U.S. Case Law Determining 
Whether a Foreign Proceeding Is “Main” or “Nonmain” or Neither, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5, 
Art. 4 (2008) (explaining that the “main” and “nonmain” concepts under Chapter 15 
were promoted by the Model Law, which adopted those concepts from the EU 
Regulation); see also Model Law, supra note 3. 
55. See ABOUT UNCITRAL, ORIGIN, MANDATE, AND COMPOSITION, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited June 9, 2011) (stating 
that “[t]he Commission is composed of sixty member States elected by the General 
Assembly.”); ABOUT UNCITRAL, FAQ, WHAT IS A WORKING GROUP? 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods_faq.html (last visited June 9, 
2011) (“Membership of working groups currently includes all States members of 
UNCITRAL.”). 
56. See Model Law, supra note 3, pmbl. (stating that the purpose of the Model 
Law is to provide a mechanism for handling cross-border insolvencies, to promote 
cooperation between nations, provide greater legal certainty for investors, to fairly and 
efficiently administer insolvencies, to maximize the debtor’s assets, and to facilitate the 
rescue of troubled multinational businesses to protect employment and investment 
interests). 
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border insolvency laws consistent with the legal system and 
policies of the enacting state.57 To date, nineteen countries have 
adopted domestic legislation based on its principles.58 Unlike 
the EU Regulation, the Model Law does not call upon enacting 
nations to suspend their local choice of law rules.59 While 
UNCITRAL tried, it failed to adopt uniform choice of law rules, 
and as a result, these matters are governed by established rules 
and practices of each enacting state.60 The Model Law thus 
offers a basic framework for the jurisdictional treatment of cross-
border insolvency proceedings by providing a method for 
determining the validity of an insolvency proceeding and, 
subsequently, the effects of recognition.61 
Articles 15 through 17 of the Model Law govern the 
procedure for recognizing a foreign insolvency.62 Enacting states 
should recognize a foreign insolvency as either a “foreign main 
proceeding,” if it is taking place in the debtor’s COMI, or as a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
57. See Model Law, supra note 3, pmbl. (explaining that the purpose of the 
Model Law is to streamline cross-border insolvencies world-wide); LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, 
supra note 32, at 311 (asserting that the Model Law takes into account differing 
approaches in national insolvency laws by leaving enacting states to indicate the 
meaning of the terms in italics within square brackets. 
58. See STATUS: 1997—MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_
status.html (last visited June 9, 2011) (listing the nineteen countries). 
59. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 67–68 (“In the case of such 
insolvency proceedings [involving parties or assets located in different States], the 
forum State will usually apply its local conflict of laws rules to determine which law is 
applicable to the validity and effectiveness of a right or claim and to their treatment in 
the insolvency proceedings. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
. . . does not include harmonized conflict of laws rules for adoption by enacting States, 
thus leaving these matters to established rules and practices.”). 
60. See UNCITRAL Rep. of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work 
of the Eighteenth Session, 29th Sess., May 28–June 14, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/419, 
¶¶ 46–59, (Dec. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Rep. of the Working Group] (explaining that 
UNCITRAL could not agree to impose a system to resolve conflicts of law on enacting 
states in its Model Law); LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 67–68 (stating that the 
forum state will usually apply its own conflict of law rules to an international insolvency 
to determine which law is applicable to the validity and effectiveness of a right or 
claim). 
61. See generally Model Law, supra note 3, pmbl. (stating that the purpose of the 
Model Law is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border 
insolvency and setting forth, in Chapter III of the Model Law, the process for 
recognizing an insolvency and explaining the effects of that recognition); see also infra 
notes 62–73 (discussing the Model Law articles that explain the steps for recognition 
and the effects of recognition). 
62. See Model Law, supra note 3, arts. 15–17. 
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“foreign non-main proceeding,” if it is occurring in a country 
where the debtor has an establishment.63 The effects of 
recognition of a foreign insolvency are expressed in Articles 20 
through 24 of the Model Law.64 Some effects of recognition are 
automatic; for example, Article 20 calls for an automatic stay of 
adverse activities against the debtor upon recognition of a 
foreign main proceeding.65 Some effects are discretionary and 
depend on the insolvency rights granted under the domestic law 
of the enacting state.66 Article 21 is a discretionary article, stating 
that, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding and at the 
request of the foreign representative, courts may “grant any 
appropriate relief, including . . . relief that may be available to 
[insert the title of a person or body administering a reorganization or 
liquidation under the law of the enacting State] under the laws of 
this State.”67 The italicized portion of this text is to be filled in by 
                                                                                                                                                                     
63. Id. art. 17(2). 
64. See id. arts. 20–24. 
65. Id. art. 20(1). 
66. Id. art. 21; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
BORDER INSOLVENCY ¶¶ 154, 159 [hereinafter GUIDE TO ENACTMENT] (explaining that 
relief under Article 21 is discretionary and that courts may grant “any type of relief that 
is available under the law of the enacting State and needed in the circumstances of the 
case” and asserting that with respect to Article 21, “the proviso ‘under the law of this 
State’ reflects the principle underlying the Model Law that recognition of a foreign 
proceeding does not mean extending the effects of the foreign proceeding as they may 
be prescribed by the law of the foreign State. Instead, recognition of a foreign 
proceeding entails attaching to the foreign proceeding consequences envisaged by the 
law of the enacting State.”). 
67. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 21; see UNCITRAL, Rep. of the Working Group, 
supra note 60 (showing that although UNCITRAL considered having Article 21 govern 
avoidance actions, it decided instead to create a separate article: “While agreeing with 
the principle that a foreign representative should be given the right to commence 
actions to reverse or render unenforceable legal acts detrimental to creditors 
(sometimes referred to as “Paulian actions”), the Working Group considered that it 
would be preferable to delete the reference to them in subparagraph (b)(v) [of article 
12 which covers the effects of recognition, i.e. the predecessor to Article 21 of the 
Model Law]. The numerous issues raised by such actions did not lend themselves to 
simple and harmonized solutions within the limited scope of Article 12 [predecessor to 
present Model Law Article 21]. The Working Group decided to remove the reference 
to those actions from (b)(v) [of Article 12; present Model Law Article 21]. However, 
the Working Group decided to consider, at a later stage, the question whether certain 
limited aspects concerning those actions could be dealt with in a separate article in the 
Model Provisions [present Model Law Article 23]. It was stated that such actions might 
present the only possible way for a foreign representative to recover assets. It was stated 
that, in any event, the standing of the foreign representative to commence such actions 
should be tied to recognition.”); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, at 62 (showing 
that Article 12 was the predecessor to current Model Law Article 21 because at the end 
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enacting states, with terms and rules consistent with their 
national insolvency laws.68 
Other effects of recognition enumerated in the Model Law 
merely provide standing to a foreign insolvency representative.69 
An example of this is Article 23, which governs avoidance 
actions and aims to ensure that a foreign representative is not 
deprived of standing to commence an avoidance action simply 
because they are foreign.70 Article 23 provides that “[u]pon 
recognition of a foreign proceeding, “the foreign representative 
has standing to initiate [refer to the types of actions to avoid or 
otherwise render ineffective acts detrimental to creditors that are 
available in this State to a person or body administering a 
reorganization or liquidation].”71 Article 23 does not determine 
which law should govern avoidance actions or the circumstances 
under which such relief can be commenced72 Instead, these 
matters are left to enacting states.73 
Since issues regarding choice of law, particularly with 
respect to avoidance actions, may arise in the context of cross-
border insolvencies, UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide addresses 
these issues in its commentary and recommendations.74 It notes 
that some countries leave choice of law determinations 
regarding avoidance actions to their local choice of law rules or 
may steadfastly apply only the law of a debtor’s COMI.75 Other 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the Guide to Enactment’s discussion on Model Article 21 there is a heading called 
Discussion in UNCITRAL and in the Working Group that lists working group document 
A/CN.9/433, ¶¶ 127–134 and 138–139). 
68. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 311 (asserting that the Model Law 
takes into account differing approaches in national insolvency laws by leaving enacting 
states to indicate the meaning of the terms in italics within square brackets). 
69. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 23 (providing standing to a foreign insolvency 
representative to commence an avoidance action). 
70. GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, at 167. 
71. Model Law, supra note 3, art. 23. 
72. See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, ¶ 166 (stating that Model Law 
Article 23 was “drafted narrowly in that it does not create any substantive right 
regarding [avoidance actions] and also does not provide any solution involving conflict 
of laws”). 
73. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (asserting that the Model Law 
does not harmonize conflict of laws rules for adoption by enacting states, but rather 
leaves that decision to the enacting states’ established rules and practices). 
74. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 71. 
75. See id. at 67–68, 71 (explaining that when conflicts of law arise some states 
will apply their local choice of law rules to resolve while others may decide to apply the 
law governing the debtor’s COMI). 
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countries apply the law of the place where the transfer 
occurred.76 Still other countries might adopt a rule combining 
the law of a debtor’s COMI with the law governing the place of 
transfer. For example, a country could permit the law governing 
the COMI to control only if the transfer is avoidable both under 
the COMI’s law and the law where the transfer took place.77 
Enacting states have dealt with Article 23, which governs 
avoidance actions, in different ways. Some states, such as 
Asutrailia and South Africa, drafted Article 23 to provide foreign 
insolvency representatives with standing to commence an 
avoidance action to the extent such relief is available under their 
local laws.78 South Africa’s version of the Model Law provides 
that a non-South African insolvency representative may 
commence an avoidance action only under South African law.79 
Likewise, Australia’s version of the Model Law permits non-
Australian insolvency representatives to avoid transfers solely 
according to Australian avoidance laws.80 Japan’s version of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
76. See id. at 71 (asserting that some countries look to the law governing the 
transfer to also govern the avoidance action). 
77. See id. (explaining that some states determine choice of law based on whether 
the transfer is avoidable either under the law of the debtor’s COMI or the law where 
the transfer took place, for example, by stipulating that the law of the place of transfer 
will govern, unless the law of the debtor’s COMI is stricter than that law). 
78. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 §§ 21 & 23 (S. Afr.) (“21. (1) 
Upon recognition of foreign proceedings, whether main or non-main, where necessary 
to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the court may, at the 
request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief, including—(g) 
granting any additional relief that may be available to a trustee, liquidator, judicial 
manager, curator of an institution, or receiver under the laws of the Republic. . . . 23. 
(1) Upon recognition of foreign proceedings, the foreign representative has standing 
to initiate any legal action to set aside a disposition that is available to a trustee or 
liquidator under the laws of the Republic relating to insolvency.”); Rachel Kelly & 
Claire van Zuylen, South Africa, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 229, 242 (2009) 
(“Section 23 of the [South African] Cross-Border Insolvency Act enacts Article 23 of 
the Model Law and grants the foreign representative the same authority to initiative 
legal proceedings to set aside a disposition as is available to a trustee or liquidator 
under the South African laws of insolvency.”); Explanatory Memorandum, Cross-Border 
Insolvency Bill 2008 (Cth) 12–13 (Austl.) (“For articles 14, 21, 23, 28 and 29 of the 
Model Law ‘the law of this State’ is a reference to Commonwealth law. In each case the 
relevant laws are the Corporations Act and the Bankruptcy Act, both of which are laws 
of the Commonwealth.”). 
79. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act § 21 (S. Afr.); Kelly & van Zuylen, supra note 
78, at 242. 
80. See Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Cth) § 23 (Austl.); Explanatory 
Memorandum, Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 12–13 (Austl.); Rosalind Mason, Australia, in 
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Model Law does not enact Model Law Article 23, but states that 
a non-Japanese insolvency representative may commence an 
insolvency proceeding in Japan to bring an avoidance action.81 
These enactments are consistent with the drafters’ 
understanding of Article 23. The Model Law’s Guide to 
Enactment and Legislative Guide explain that the procedural 
standing provided by Model Law Article 23 extends only to 
rights available to local insolvency representatives.82 Accordingly, 
countries implementing the Model Law should adopt Article 23 
permission for foreign insolvency representatives to bring an 
avoidance action, if such right is available to domestic entities.83 
E. US TREATMENT OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES 
The US approach to cross-border insolvency developed 
initially through the common-law doctrine of comity, whereby 
courts held discretion to assist or recognize non-US bankruptcy 
judgments.84 In 1978, this doctrine was codified in § 304 of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 15, 33 (2009) (explaining that, in Article 23, the governing 
law for avoidance actions is that of the Commonwealth). 
81. See Shinichiro Abe, Japan, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 139, 146 (explaining 
that a provision like Article 23 “is not included in Japan’s insolvency laws—rather, the 
foreign representative is given full standing under the same conditions as domestic 
creditors”); see generally Gaikoku tosan shori tetsuduki no shonin enjo ni kansuru horitsu 
[Law Relating to Recognition and Assistance for Foreign Insolvency Proceedings] Law 
No. 129 of 2000 (Japan), translation available at http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/
information/lrtr-01.html (showing that Japan’s cross-border insolvency law does not have 
an avoidance provision like Model Law Article 23). 
82. See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, ¶¶ 165–66 (“The procedural 
standing conferred by article 23 extends only to actions that are available to the local 
insolvency administrator in the context of an insolvency proceeding” and “[t]he effect 
of the provision is that a foreign representative is not prevented from initiating such 
actions by the sole fact that the foreign representative is not the insolvency 
administrator appointed in the enacting State.”) 
83. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (explaining that Australia and 
South Africa adopted Article 23 as permitting insolvency representatives to bring 
avoidance actions in accordance with Australian and South African laws and that Japan 
did not adopt it, but Japanese law explains how a foreign insolvency representative may 
avoid a transfer in Japan). Article 23 suggests that an insolvency representative’s right 
to commence an avoidance action be consistent with the enacting state’s policies. See 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, ¶ 166 (explaining that a foreign insolvency 
representative should not be deprived of an insolvency right available in that local 
jurisdiction simply because they are foreign). 
84. See Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883) (holding that 
international comity permits deference to the insolvency judgment of a Canadian 
court); Mary Elaine Knecht, The “Drapery of Illusion” of Section 304—What Lurks Beneath: 
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US Bankruptcy Code.85 That section permitted US courts to 
provide ancillary relief to a non-US insolvency representative, 
guided primarily by comity, but also consistent with the 
following factors: just treatment to claim holders, protection of 
US parties, preventing fraudulent transfers, and providing 
debtors with a fresh start.86 Courts had broad discretion to 
interpret § 304 to decide what assistance, if any, should be 
provided to non-US insolvencies.87 However, since US courts 
were afforded so much discretion in fashioning relief under 
§ 304, case law under this provision of the bankruptcy code 
produced inconsistent results.88 
In 2006, Congress replaced § 304 with Chapter 15 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code (“Chapter 15”).89 The language of Chapter 15 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Territoriality in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 U. PA. J. 
INT’L BUS. L. 287, 312–13 (1992) (explaining that the doctrine of comity preceded 
enactment of § 304). 
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2006) (repealed 2005); In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 
169–70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (explaining that Congress codified the common law 
principles of comity in § 304). 
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (permitting courts to grant relief based on “what will best 
assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with—
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate; (2) 
protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience 
in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; (3) prevention of preferential 
or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate; (4) distribution of proceeds of 
such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title; (5) 
comity; and (6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the 
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns”). 
87. See, e.g., Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd., 29 B.R. 417, 418–19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983) 
(deferring to non-US law and giving effect to a Canadian bankruptcy on comity 
grounds because that would “best assure an economical and expeditious 
administration of [the] estate”); see generally Toga, 28 B.R. 165 (refusing to defer to 
non-US law and explaining that § 304 permitted US courts to make discretionary 
decisions under the circumstances of each case—rather than making them bound by 
inflexible rules—and thus denying a Canadian company’s legal claim based on 
Canadian law in order to protect American interests). 
88. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 
1985) (affirming grant of comity to a non-US bankruptcy because that would best serve 
US interests); In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that differences 
between US law and non-US law can warrant rejecting recognition of a non-US 
judgment); Knecht, supra note 84, at 288 (discussing In re Koreag, Controle et Revision 
S.A., 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) which determined that US courts should 
defer to non-US bankruptcy law and principles to determine whether certain property 
was part of the debtor’s estate). 
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2006) (“The purpose of this chapter is to 
incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective 
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tracks that of the Model Law, but also incorporates US policies.90 
Due to its similarity to the Model Law, when applying Chapter 
15, US courts are guided by application of the Model Law in 
other countries and, to a lesser extent, by § 304.91 
To obtain recognition under Chapter 15, a non-US 
insolvency representative must file a petition with the US 
Bankruptcy Court asserting whether recognition is being sought 
for a foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding.92 Preceding 
recognition, pursuant to § 1519, US courts may provide 
preliminary relief to the petitioning party, such as a 
discretionary stay under US law.93 Upon recognition, additional 
relief arises,94 including the possibility of further discretionary 
relief.95 For either automatic or discretionary relief to become 
                                                                                                                                                                     
mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency . . . .”); see also supra note 
1 (recognizing that this change was passed in Congress in 2006). 
90. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1501, with Model Law, supra note 3 (revealing that 
Chapter 15, nearly verbatim, incorporates the language of the Model Law, with 
modifications that are specific to US law, such as the exclusion of avoidance relief 
under Chapter 15). The numbered provisions of the Model Law even correspond to 
the numbered provisions under Chapter 15, in that, for example, Model Law Article 23 
is the corresponding provision to 11 U.S.C. § 1523. See Model Law, supra note 3, art. 23; 
11 U.S.C. § 1523; see also In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2006) (“The language of Chapter 15 tracks the Model Law, with adaptations designed 
to mesh with United States law.”). 
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006) (“In interpreting [Chapter 15], the court shall 
consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this 
chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign 
jurisdictions.”). Mention of § 304 case law exists only in the commentary to § 1507, a 
provision permitting courts to provide additional assistance to non-US insolvency 
representatives subject to other provisions of Chapter 15 and consistent with comity. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1507; H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 119 (2005) (“[J]urisprudence which 
developed under § 304 is preserved in the context of new section 1507. On deciding 
whether to grant the additional assistance contemplated by section 1507, the court 
must consider the same factors specified in former section 304.”); id. at 109 (explaining 
that § 1507 permits courts to grant additional relief, but shall not be a basis for denying 
or limiting relief otherwise available under Chapter 15). 
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006) (“A case under this chapter is commenced by the 
filing of a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding under section 1515.”); 11 
U.S.C. § 1515 (“A foreign representative applies to the court for recognition of a 
foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has been appointed by filing a 
petition for recognition.”). 
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006) (providing that while a petition for recognition is 
pending, “where relief is urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the 
interests of the creditors, [courts may] grant relief of a provisional nature, including—
(1) staying execution against the debtor’s assets”). 
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006). 
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (2006). 
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available, however, the court must determine where a debtor’s 
COMI exists and, based on that analysis, grant recognition 
either as a foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding.96 
The breadth of discretionary authority granted to a US 
bankruptcy court pursuant to § 1521 is sweeping.97 The court 
may grant “any additional relief that may be available . . . except 
for relief available under sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 
and 724(a).”98 Section 1521 thus allows courts to provide non-
US insolvency representatives with additional relief under US 
law.99 The relief excepted from § 1521 governs US avoidance 
powers.100 This section’s legislative history explains this exclusion 
by reference to the authority of a non-US insolvency 
representative’s status to bring avoidance actions under 
§ 1523.101 
Section 1523 states, in relevant part, that upon recognition 
“the foreign representative has standing in a case concerning 
the debtor pending under another chapter of this title to initiate 
actions under sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 553, and 
724(a).”102 This section’s legislative history explains that § 1523 
provides a non-US insolvency representative with the option to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
96. See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, 
Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 126–27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 389 B.R. 325, 336 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that recognition must be coded as either main or non-main 
under Chapter 15); see, e.g., In re SPhinX Ltd., 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (analyzing 
the level of activity of a corporation in the Caribbean, considering third party 
expectations, determining that the debtor’s COMI was in the United States and not in 
the Caribbean, and denying recognition as a foreign main proceeding, but granting 
recognition as a foreign non-main proceeding). 
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521. 
98. Id. (emphasis added). Section 1521 adopts Model Law Article 21 nearly 
verbatim except for a modification in (a)(7). Compare id., with Model Law, supra note 3, 
art. 21. 
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521; see also GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 66, at 61 
(asserting that Model Law Article 21 is present to provide foreign insolvency 
representatives with additional assistance under the law of the enacting state, which 
under Chapter 15 means that courts can provide non-US insolvency representatives 
other assistance that would be available to a US bankruptcy trustee). 
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 724(a) (2006); see also H.R. 
REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115 (2005) (“The exceptions in . . . [§ 1521] relate to avoiding 
powers.”). 
101. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115. Model Law Article 21 was not meant 
to be an independent vehicle for avoidance actions. See Rep. of the Working Group on 
Insolvency Law, supra note 67, ¶ 134 (showing that UNCITRAL determined to adopt a 
wholly separate article to govern avoidance relief). 
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1523 (emphasis added). 
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commence an avoidance action only in a plenary proceeding 
under another chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code.103 
Furthermore, it states that § 1523 does not “create or imply any 
legal rules with respect to the choice of applicable law . . . 
[and] courts will determine . . . what national law may be 
applicable to such action.”104 Section 1523 therefore only 
permits a non-US insolvency representative to commence an 
avoidance action through a plenary proceeding under either 
Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.105 It also leaves 
open the question of which law should apply to such an 
action.106 As a result, choice of law rules generally applicable in 
federal district courts should control.107 
Since § 304 case law provides guidance where Chapter 15 
does not, § 304 case law discussing choice of law in avoidance 
actions brought in connection with a recognized non-US 
insolvency should still be good law.108 The last word on the 
subject from the Second Circuit in In re Maxwell explains that 
US choice of law principles should guide this determination and 
should ultimately turn on the center of gravity of the transfer.109 
In sum, while the EU Regulation sets forth both mandatory 
jurisdiction and choice of law rules for cross-border avoidance 
actions among Member States, the Model Law provides only 
jurisdictional guidance with respect to COMI, leaving enacting 
states with the task of determining how to address the choice of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
103. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 116. 
104. See id. 
105. Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code governs the liquidation of a debtor’s 
estate. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (9th ed. 2009) (defining Chapter 7 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code). Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code governs the reorganization 
of a debtor’s affairs. See id. (explaining Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code). 
106. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (stating that once an 
avoidance action is commenced through Chapter 7 or 11, US courts will determine 
“what national law may be applicable to such action”). 
107. See generally In re Maxwell Commc’ns Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048, 1053 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (noting that US choice of law principles apply to determine which law will 
govern an avoidance action in the United States brought in connection with a non-US 
insolvency proceeding and explaining that, for example, US choice of law principles 
call for applying the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the avoidance 
action). 
108. See supra note 91 (discussing the role of § 304 case law under Chapter 15). 
109. See Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1051 (holding that because the debtor’s “center of 
gravity” was in England—the debtor and most of its creditors were British, and the debt 
was incurred in England,—British rather than US law should govern the avoidance 
action). 
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law questions that remain.110 With its enactment of § 1523, 
Congress restricted all avoidance actions sought in connection 
with a Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding, by requiring, first, the 
commencement of a plenary proceedings under Chapter 7 or 11 
of the US Bankruptcy Code.111 Moreover as Congress did not 
codify a choice of law rule for such avoidance actions, § 304 case 
law guides this determination.112 As the decisive US authority on 
the subject, Maxwell sets forth the choice of law rule for 
avoidance actions in this context.113 
II. CONDOR 
The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined 
in Fogerty v. Petroquest (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.) (“Condor”) that a 
non-US insolvency representative could commence an 
avoidance action via Chapter 15 under non-US avoidance law.114 
To reach this decision, Condor employed a textual analysis of 
Chapter 15.115 In order to reconcile its holding with § 1523, 
which states that all avoidance actions brought in connection 
with a Chapter 15 case must be brought through Chapter 7 or 
11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, the court explained that § 1523 
exists only to provide insolvency representatives with the option 
to commence an avoidance action under US law.116 Where the 
non-US insolvency representative seeks to commence an 
avoidance action under non-US law, Condor instead viewed 
§ 1521 as controlling. 117 Since § 1521 does not, on its face, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
110. See supra Part I.C–D (discussing the scope of the EU Regulation and the 
Model Law). 
111. See supra Part I.E (explaining how Chapter 15 adopted Model Law Article 21 
and 23 and stating that the legislative history of § 1521 explains that all avoidance 
actions brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case are governed by § 1523). 
112. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (explaining that § 1523 
explicitly leaves open the possibility that a non-US insolvency representative can 
commence an avoidance action under either US or non-US law). 
113. See supra note 109 (discussing Maxwell’s rule). 
114. Fogerty v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 323 
(5th Cir. 2010) (stating that because § 1521 is silent about avoidance under non-US 
law, Condor Insurance can pursue an avoidance action via this section under non-US 
avoidance law). 
115. See infra Part II.B (explaining Condor’s rationale). 
116. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining Condor’s view of 
§ 1523). 
117. See infra notes 128–130 and accompanying text (explaining Condor’s view of 
§ 1521). 
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precondition relief under this section on commencement of a 
plenary proceeding, the court saw no textual reason to preclude 
the representative’s request.118 
For the purposes of analyzing this decision, this Part 
explains the Condor case. Part II.A sets forth Condor’s factual and 
procedural history in the bankruptcy court, the district court, 
and in the Fifth Circuit. Part II.B then explains the court’s 
rationale, including its textual analysis of Chapter 15. 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 16, 2007, Condor Insurance declared 
bankruptcy in St. Kitts & Nevis.119 Its liquidators subsequently 
filed for Chapter 15 recognition in the US Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Mississippi.120 On May 18, 2007, the bankruptcy 
court recognized Condor Insurance as a foreign main 
proceeding.121 Thereafter, Condor Insurance commenced an 
avoidance action under St. Kitts & Nevis law against Condor 
Guaranty Trust (“Condor Guaranty”), its US subsidiary, seeking, 
among other things, to recover US$313 million in allegedly 
fraudulently transferred assets.122 
On July 17, 2008, the bankruptcy court dismissed the 
avoidance action on the grounds that to bring an avoidance 
action, Condor Insurance must first file a plenary proceeding 
under Chapter 7 or 11.123 Because Condor Insurance, as an 
insurance company, could not file for Chapter 7 or 11, it 
appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision.124 On February 9, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (2006) (revealing that this section does not require 
non-US insolvency representatives to commence a plenary proceeding to obtain 
additional relief). 
119. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d. at 319. 
120. See id. at 320. 
121. See id. at 321. 
122. See Fogerty v. Petroquest Res., Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 2008 WL 
2858943 *1 (Bankr. S.D. Miss., July 17, 2008) aff’d, 411 B.R. 314 (S.D. Miss. 2009), rev’d, 
601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010). 
123. See id. at *3. 
124. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d at 327 (explaining that non-US insurance 
companies do not have access to Chapters 7 and 11); see also 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006) 
(stating that insurance companies may not be debtors under federal bankruptcy law). 
Rather, state law governs the reorganization or liquidation of both US and non-US 
insurance companies; see, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7406–07 (McKinney 2000) (providing 
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2009, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision.125 The liquidators of Condor Insurance then appealed 
to the Fifth Circuit.126 In its March 17, 2010 decision, the US 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the two lower 
court decisions and held that pursuant to § 1521, US courts may 
grant avoidance relief via Chapter 15 but only pursuant to the 
non-US avoidance law governing in the main insolvency case.127 
B. RATIONALE 
Employing a textual analysis of Chapter 15, the court found 
§ 1521’s silence on avoidance actions under non-US law 
significant, and determined that while § 1521 precludes 
avoidance under US law, it does not exclude avoidance under 
non-US law.128 The court focused on § 1521, which states that US 
courts may grant any appropriate relief.129 It found that while 
§ 1523 provides a non-US insolvency representative only with the 
option to commence an avoidance action under US law by 
means of a Chapter 7 or 11 plenary case § 1521 is a vehicle for 
avoidance actions under the law governing the debtor’s 
COMI.130 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“[g]rounds for conservation of assets of a foreign or alien insurer” and “[a]n order of 
conservation or ancillary liquidation of a foreign or alien insurer”). 
125. Fogerty v. Petroquest Res., Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 411 B.R. 314 
(S.D. Miss. 2009), rev’d, 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010). 
126. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010). 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 324 (invoking the statutory maxim “expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius” the court explained that, while the statute [11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(7)] denies the 
non-US representative powers of avoidance created by the US Code absent a filing 
under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it does not necessarily follow that 
Congress intended to deny the non-US representative powers of avoidance supplied by 
applicable non-US law.). 
129. See id. (“The statute provides for ‘any relief’ and excepts only actions under 
522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a) of the Code and includes no other language 
suggesting that other relief might be excepted. . . . If Congress wished to bar all 
avoidance actions whatever their source, it could have stated so; it did not.”). 
130. See id. at 323 (“Where avoidance actions under U.S. law are excluded from a 
Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding, section 1523(a) ensures they may be brought in a full 
bankruptcy proceeding. And to ensure that a foreign representative enjoys the status of 
a trustee under those provisions, section 1523(a) grants standing to a foreign 
representative wishing to pursue an avoidance action not under its domestic law but 
under U.S. bankruptcy law in a Chapter 7 or 11 proceeding . . . .”); id. at 323–24 
(“[S]ection 1523(a) grants no substantive right of avoidance. Rather it lifts a potential 
standing roadblock for resort to Chapter 7 or 11.”). The court also stated that § 1523 
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In reaching this conclusion, the court took a broad view on 
its authority under Chapter 15. It explained that § 1521 permits 
avoidance under non-US law because Chapter 15, taken as a 
whole, provides courts with authority to assist non-US insolvency 
representatives.131 Citing to case law decided under § 304, the 
court determined that § 1521 adopts the rule from In re Metzeler, 
a district court case holding that non-US insolvency 
representatives seeking recognition should only be able to 
commence avoidance actions under the non-US law governing 
the main insolvency case in an ancillary proceeding under 
§ 304.132 Condor defended this decision as pragmatic, because it 
avoids the need for expansive plenary proceedings brought 
under US law, and, specifically in this case, prevents the United 
States from becoming a haven for fraudulent transfers by 
insurance companies.133 Finally, the court asserted that this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
codifies the rule from a § 304 case called In re Metzeler, which provides that a non-US 
insolvency representative may only commence an avoidance action under non-US law 
through § 304. See id. at 329 (“Congress essentially made explicit In re Metzeler’s 
articulation of the bar on access to avoidance powers created by the U.S. code by 
foreign representatives in ancillary proceedings.”). 
131. See id. at 325 (“[A]s a catch-all, under section 1507 the court has authority 
to provide additional assistance to a foreign representative subject to the restrictions 
elsewhere in the Chapter.”); id. (“Though the language does not explicitly address the 
use of foreign avoidance law, it suggests a broad reading of the powers granted to the 
district court in order to advance the goals of comity to foreign jurisdictions.”). 
132. See id. at 328 (citing In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)) 
(asserting that a non-US insolvency representative may only commence an avoidance 
action under non-US law, because, relying on one academic article, this is more 
consistent with comity and because the US Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly permit 
non-US insolvency representatives to invoke US avoiding powers); see also id. at 328 n.50 
(listing several other cases that also rely on Metzeler including: In re Aerovias Nacionales 
de Columbia S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing where a 
debtor may file for insolvency and not discussing avoidance actions, choice of law in a 
non-US proceeding seeking recognition, or Metzeler); In re Griffin Trading Co., 270 
B.R. 883 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Metzeler only to help define the term “US 
Trustee”); Petition of Kojima, 177 B.R. 696, 7032 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) (permitting 
avoidance under Japanese law after comparing US and Japanese avoidance laws, and 
citing to Metzeler for authority to permit such relief); and In re Tarricone, 80 B.R. 21 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing an avoidance action by a non-US insolvency 
representative under US law because it was brought too late for recovery and because, 
citing to Metzeler, it should have been brought under German law)); see also supra note 
130. 
133. See In re Condor, 601 F.3d at 327 (“Congress did not intend to restrict the 
powers of the U.S. court to apply the law of the country where the main proceeding 
pends. Refusing to do so would lend a measure of protection to debtors to hide assets 
in the United States out of the reach of the foreign jurisdiction, forcing foreign 
representatives to initiate much more expansive proceedings to recover assets 
2011] WAS CONDOR CORRECT? 375 
reading of the statute fosters predictability in international 
insolvencies.134 
Thus, Condor concluded that Condor Insurance’s avoidance 
action could proceed under St. Kitts & Nevis law via § 1521. In 
so holding, it determined that Chapter 15 is a vehicle for 
avoidance actions. It also found that the law of a debtor’s COMI 
should govern an avoidance action brought pursuant to § 1521. 
III. CRITIQUE OF CONDOR 
While the decision provided Condor Insurance with the 
relief it sought, it broadly reframed the ability of a non-US 
representative to commence avoidance actions following 
recognition of a non-US proceeding under Chapter 15.135 
Chapter 15 sanctions the commencement of avoidance actions 
only in the context of a pending plenary proceeding under 
Chapter 7 or 11.136 Moreover, although US courts occasionally 
enforce non-US law, they do so only after engaging in a choice 
of law analysis that directs application of non-US law.137 Condor 
does not condition its conclusion that § 1521 enables non-US 
insolvency representatives to commence an avoidance action in 
a US court under the law of the debtor’s COMI on such a choice 
                                                                                                                                                                     
fraudulently conveyed, the scenario Chapter 15 was designed to prevent. We are not 
persuaded that Congress has unwittingly facilitated such tactics—-with foreign 
insurance companies, access to Chapters 7 and 11 is otherwise denied.”). 
134. See id. (“And this silence [regarding non-US avoidance law] is loud given 
the history of the statute including the efforts of the United States to create processes 
for transnational businesses in extremis.”); see id. (“The application of foreign 
avoidance law in a Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding raises fewer choice of law concerns 
as the court is not required to create a separate bankruptcy estate. It accepts the helpful 
marriage of avoidance and distribution whether the proceeding is ancillary applying 
foreign law or a full proceeding applying domestic law—a marriage that avoids the 
more difficult depecage rules of conflict law presented by avoidance and distribution 
decisions governed by different sources of law.”). 
135. See supra Part II.B (explaining Condor’s rationale and noting that it is not 
limited to insurance companies). 
136. See supra Part I.E (explaining that § 1523 is the only governing provision 
under Chapter 15 for avoidance actions and that it requires a non-US insolvency 
representative to first commence a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11). 
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 1523 (2006) (explaining that a non-US insolvency 
representative may commence an avoidance action only within the framework of a 
plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code). 
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of law analysis. Nor does it even mention that Maxwell calls upon 
US courts to do so.138 
To explain this, Part III critiques Condor’s holding and 
rationale. Part III.A examines Condor’s textual analysis of 
Article 21, § 1521, Article 23 and § 1523. It also discusses the 
structure and text of Chapter 15 and the role of statutory 
interpretation and comity under this chapter of the US 
Bankruptcy Code. Part III.B responds to Condor’s suggestion that 
US courts unwaveringly defer to the avoidance law of a debtor’s 
COMI. It does so by scrutinizing the § 304 cases cited by Condor. 
Finally, Part III.C discusses why Condor’s characterization of 
Chapter 15 is inconsistent with US policies and therefore with 
the spirit of Chapter 15. 
A. CHAPTER 15’s ORIGIN IN THE MODEL LAW DOES NOT 
SUPPORT CONDOR’S TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
Chapter 15’s origin in the Model Law is exceptionally 
relevant to understanding the purpose of each section under 
Chapter 15.139 Article 21 of the Model Law looks to provide 
enacting states with the opportunity to give foreign insolvency 
representatives additional assistance under the local laws of the 
enacting state.140 As such, § 1521 should be construed to permit 
US courts to grant additional relief available under US law to 
non-US insolvency representatives.141 While Congress explicitly 
excluded avoidance actions under US law from § 1521, 
Congress’ silence about avoidance under non-US law does not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
138. Id. 
139. See supra note 89–90 (showing that Chapter 15 is based upon the Model 
Law). 
140. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of 
Model Law Article 21); see also supra note 78 (citing Article 21 South Africa’s Cross-
Border Insolvency Act, which shows that additional relief under its version of Model 
Law Article 21 is limited to relief available under South African law and citing to an 
Explanatory Memorandum on Australia’s Cross Border Insolvency Bill, which likewise 
restricts all forms of additional relief in Australia’s version of Article 21 to Australian 
law). 
141. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (explaining that pursuant to 
§ 1521 US courts may provide additional assistance to non-US insolvency 
representatives only under US law). 
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mean that avoidance actions are permitted under non-US law 
pursuant to § 1521.142 
In any event, Article 21 of the Model Law and accordingly 
Chapter 15’s § 1521 were not intended to govern avoidance 
actions.143 In formulating the Model Law, a report of the 
working group explains that Article 21 was not supposed to 
address avoidance actions.144 Instead, the working group 
determined to draft a separate article governing avoidance 
actions.145 Model Law Article 23 (and, accordingly, § 1523 of 
Chapter 15) alone governs avoidance actions.146 Section 1521’s 
legislative history similarly explains that all avoidance actions are 
governed by § 1523.147 
Thus, § 1523 is the only controlling provision relating to 
avoidance actions brought by a non-US representative following 
recognition under Chapter 15.148 Section 1523’s legislative 
history explains that this provision is not intended to resolve 
choice of law determinations; as such, it encompasses avoidance 
actions under both US and non-US law and requires all 
avoidance actions to be brought through a plenary proceeding 
under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.149 
Since §§ 1521 and 1523 are clear, they do not invite 
statutory interpretation. Congress explained in its legislative 
history that although § 1507 preserves § 304 case law and the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
142. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (showing that Congress 
excluded avoidance under US law from § 1521); supra notes 128–30 and accompanying 
text (explaining Condor’s view that the silence in § 1521 about avoidance actions under 
non-US law means that they are permitted under this section of Chapter 15). 
143. See Rep. of the Working Group on Insolvency Law, supra note 66 (discussing 
Model Law Article 21’s purpose).  
144. See Rep. of the Working Group on Insolvency Law, supra note 66 (explaining 
that avoidance actions were excluded from the general provision governing the effects 
of recognition under the Model Law because of their sensitive nature and instead 
would be dealt with by a separate article, which would become present Article 23). 
145. See supra note 67 (explaining that UNCITRAL determined to adopt a 
separate article to govern avoidance actions). 
146. See supra notes 69–73 and 102–07 (explaining Article 23 of the Model Law 
and § 1523 of Chapter 15). 
147. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing § 1521’s legislative 
history, which states that all avoidance actions are governed by § 1523). 
148. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text (addressing the purpose of 
§ 1523). 
149. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining that § 1523 does not 
“create or imply any legal rules with respect to the choice of applicable law . . . [and] 
courts will determine . . . what national law may be applicable to such action.”‘). 
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doctrine of comity for providing additional relief through 
§ 1521, such case law and comity cannot be used to contradict 
Chapter 15.150 Here, as § 1521’s purpose is to provide additional 
relief only under US law, it is contradictory to use comity and 
§ 1507 to alter § 1521’s function.151 It furthermore contradicts 
Chapter 15 to use § 304 case law, in this case, Metzeler, to 
rephrase § 1523’s clear rule.152 Chapter 15 does not codify any 
particular US case.153 Chapter 15 is based on the Model Law—an 
international product imported into the US’s legal system.154 
The structure of Chapter 15 thus restricts a court’s discretion to 
look to sections other than § 1523 to govern avoidance actions 
and accordingly Condor’s textual analysis is unsuitable for 
interpreting Chapter 15.155 
B. US COURTS SHOULD NOT DEFER TO NON-US AVOIDANCE 
LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS 
Condor also determined that an avoidance action governed 
by the non-US law of the debtor’s COMI and brought in 
connection with the recognition of a non-US main proceeding, 
need not comply with the limits of § 1523, which requires a non-
US insolvency representative to first commence a plenary 
proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code.156 This reading of § 1521, however, undermines the limits 
imposed in § 1523.157 It also contradicts established § 304 case 
law discussing choice of law in this context, namely Maxwell. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
150. See supra note 91 (demonstrating that § 1507 preserves § 304 case law in the 
context of providing additional relief, but only to the extent that this case law does not 
contradict Chapter 15). 
151. See supra notes 98–05 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of 
§§ 1521 and 1523). 
152. See supra note 132 (explaining that Condor states that § 1523 codified 
Metzeler’s ban on avoidance action under US law under § 304). 
153. See supra note 4 (showing that in the introduction to Chapter 15, which 
explains its purpose, there is no mention of codifying US case law). 
154.  See supra note 4 (explaining that Chapter 15 incorporates the Model Law 
into US law); supra notes 89–90 (explaining that the United States adopted a version of 
the Model Law). 
155. See supra Part I.E (discussing § 304 and Chapter 15 and showing that their 
structure is different). 
156. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text (discussing Condor’s view of 
§ 1521); supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (explaining § 1523). 
157. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text (discussing § 1523). 
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Maxwell is the seminal US authority on choice of law in 
avoidance actions in this context. Maxwell’s rule looks at where 
the center of gravity of the fraudulent conveyance or preference 
is, in order to determine which country’s law should govern in 
an avoidance action commenced by a non-US representative.158 
It requires US courts to employ US choice of law principles to 
determine which law should apply and primarily to consider the 
center of gravity of the transfer at issue to determine which 
country’s law is implicated to the greatest extent.159 Condor did 
not cite to Maxwell with respect to choice of law.160 
Condor instead found that § 304 case law permitted 
avoidance only under non-US law citing Metzeler, Tarricone, and 
Petition of Kojima—lower court decisions that preceded 
Maxwell.161 The rule in Metzeler is premised on a concern that 
non-US insolvency representatives may benefit from the use of 
US avoidance law.162 To address this concern, Metzeler created an 
arbitrary bright line rule, prohibiting non-US insolvency 
representatives from commencing avoidance actions under US 
law via § 304.163 
Although Tarricone cites Metzeler for the proposition that a 
non-US representative’s avoidance actions are permissible, if at 
all, under non-US avoidance law, it is not clear that Tarricone 
followed Metzeler’s outright ban on avoidance under US law via § 
304.164 Tarricone analyzed whether the transfer at issue was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
158. See supra note 109 (explaining Maxwell’s choice of law rule). 
159. See supra notes 109 and 132 (explaining that Maxwell holds that whether US 
or non-US law should apply to an avoidance action is determined by a conflict of law 
analysis; whereas Metzeler holds that avoidance should only be permitted under non-US 
law). 
160. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (showing that Condor made no 
mention of Maxwell and instead looked to other § 304 case law for authority on choice 
of law). 
161. The Court also cited In re Aerovias Nacionales de Columbia S.A. Avianca 
and In re Griffin—two cases that do not address avoidance actions. See supra note 132 
(stating that Aerovias Nacionales de Columbia S.A. and Griffin do not address avoidance 
and demonstrating that Metzeler, Tarricone, and Petition of Kojima were decided before 
Maxwell). 
162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing that Metzeler’s primary 
concern was that a non-US insolvency representative may benefit from using US 
avoidance law). 
163. See supra note 132 (discussing Metzeler and its holding). 
164. See supra note 132 (explaining that although Tarricone cited to Metzeler, it 
may not have been fundamental to the court’s holding). 
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avoidable under both US and non-US law, and ultimately 
determined that the avoidance action was commenced too late 
for recovery under either law.165 Thus, Tarricone seems to be 
concerned with whether the transfer was voidable under both 
US and non-US law before permitting avoidance under non-US 
law.166 Likewise, while Petition of Kojima cites Metzeler for 
authority to permit an avoidance action under non-US law, it 
only allows the avoidance action to proceed after being satisfied 
that the transfer is avoidable under both US and Japanese law.167 
Thus, the analysis in Petition of Kojima also does not support 
Metzeler’s rule that avoidance should only be permitted under 
non-US law.168 
In any event, Metzeler and Tarricone did not represent a 
trend regarding choice of law in avoidance actions under § 
304.169 Rather, as one scholar pointed out, the trend under § 304 
case law was to permit avoidance actions either under US or 
non-US law, depending on the result of a choice of law 
analysis—the rule that was later articulated in Maxwell.170 US 
courts did not historically, nor should they today, unwaveringly 
defer to non-US avoidance law.171 Accordingly, Condor’s 
suggestion that US courts should unwaveringly defer to non-US 
avoidance law is incompatible with established US choice of law 
jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
165. See supra note 132 (describing Tarricone’s reasoning). 
166. See supra note 132 (setting forth the analysis in Tarricone, which did not 
center on Metzeler). 
167. See supra note 132 (explaining that the court looked at the results of 
permitting an avoidance action to go forward under US and Japanese law in order to 
make its determination with respect to choice of law). 
168. See supra note 132 (showing that because Petition of Kojima analyzed the 
outcome of an avoidance action under two competing laws, it did not follow Metzeler’s 
bright line rule that avoidance should only be permitted under non-US law). 
169. See Westbrook, supra note 23, at 525 (concluding that the trend under § 304 
case law was to permit the use of non-US avoidance law only if the transfer was 
avoidable either under US or non-US law, at the discretion of a US court). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. (showing that historically under § 304 US courts did not unwaveringly 
defer to non-US avoidance law). 
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C. CONDOR IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT OF 
CHAPTER 15 
All avoidance actions brought in connection with a Chapter 
15 case must be sought in a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 
or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and choice of law principles 
applicable generally in US district courts control whether US or 
non-US law govern that action.172 These rules were policy 
choices made by Congress when adopting Chapter 15.173 Since 
the Model Law permits an enacting state to adopt a cross border 
insolvency law consistent with its domestic policies, Congress’ 
choices with respect to Chapter 15’s avoidance rules should be 
preserved. 
There are good reasons to limit avoidance actions to 
Chapter 7 or 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and to permit US 
courts to determine whether US or non-US law should govern 
these actions based on US choice of law principles.174 By 
relegating avoidance actions to Chapter 7 or 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code, Congress ensures that long-standing 
safeguards and jurisprudence are preserved, even in the context 
of an avoidance action brought in connection with a Chapter 15 
case.175 Moreover, non-US insolvency law may not share the 
same policy considerations as US insolvency law.176 The statute 
of limitations for avoidance actions may differ in the law of the 
debtor’s COMI and in the place where the avoidance action is 
being commenced.177 While US avoidance law has a reach back 
period of up to two years, St. Kitts & Nevis avoidance law seems 
to permit avoidance actions for up to ten years.178 
                                                                                                                                                                     
172. See supra notes 97–107 (explaining the avoidance rules under Chapter 15). 
173. See supra note 89 (explaining that Chapter 15 incorporates US policies on 
cross-border insolvency); supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Model Law gives enacting states discretion in fashioning their cross-border insolvency 
laws). 
174. See supra notes 102–09 (discussing § 1523 and Maxwell’s choice of law 
analysis). 
175. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress 
relegated all avoidance action brought in connection with a Chapter 15 case to Chapter 
7 or 11 plenary proceedings). 
176. See supra notes 31, 68 and accompanying text (explaining that insolvency 
laws can vary between countries and that an enacting state’s version of the Model Law 
incorporates its public policy choices). 
177. See supra note 31 (showing that avoidance laws can vary between countries). 
178. See supra note 31 (discussing US and St. Kitts avoidance laws). 
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Non-US avoidance law may also be incompatible with US 
insolvency policies for other reasons. For example, US 
bankruptcy law does not permit insurance companies to file for 
insolvency or commence an avoidance action under federal 
law.179 Other countries may permit regulated entities to be 
liquidated or restructured under the same laws as all other 
business entities.180 Allowing an insurance company to bring an 
avoidance action under non-US law through Chapter 15, may 
vest a non-US insurance company with more freedom in 
bankruptcy in the United States than is available to domestic 
insurance companies.181 
Unwavering deference to foreign law in cross border 
insolvencies could thus undermine policy choices of the 
enacting state—a result that is not espoused by the Model 
Law.182 Indeed, the Model Law does not promote universalism—
where states that have enacted a version of the Model Law would 
be required in all instances to apply the law governing the main 
insolvency case.183 The Model Law embraces modified 
universalism, where the tendency to defer to the law governing a 
debtor’s COMI is not exclusive.184 Modified universalism’s 
flexibility and likewise the Model Law’s framework provide 
enacting states with broad discretion to fashion cross-border 
insolvency laws consistent with their national policies.185 It is 
precisely because the Model Law permits nations to maintain 
                                                                                                                                                                     
179. See supra note 124 (explaining that under US law, both domestic and non-
US insurers must file for insolvency in state court under the supervision of state 
insurance departments). 
180. See supra Part II.B (discussing Condor’s rationale and showing that for 
example, the court did not suggest the Condor Insurance had to go through a special 
bankruptcy proceeding in St. Kitts because of its status as an insurance company). 
181. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (showing that US insurers are 
restricted to obtaining relief under state law). 
182. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that enacting states 
adopt the Model Law in a manner consistent with their national insolvency policies). 
183. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing universalism); see 
also supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that the Model Law leaves 
matters of choice of law to enacting states). 
184. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (discussing territorialism); 
supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that the Model Law leaves matters of 
choice of law to enacting states). 
185. See supra note 68 (clarifying why Model Law articles have bracketed texts). 
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their sovereign choices while fostering coordination, that it 
provides a promising framework for cross-border insolvency.186 
UNCITRAL provided enacting states with particularly great 
latitude under Model Law Article 23, recognizing that nations 
differ on whether foreign avoidance law should govern in an 
action commenced domestically following recognition of a 
foreign proceeding.187 In the same vein, the EU Regulation does 
not require Member States to defer to foreign avoidance law, 
although they are much more integrated economically and 
politically than are nations implementing a version of the Model 
Law.188 Instead, the EU Regulation calls upon Member States to 
determine whether the transfer at issue is avoidable under both 
the law of the debtor’s COMI and the law of the country where 
the avoidance action is being commenced, before permitting 
avoidance under foreign law.189 As such, there is furthermore no 
precedent in the Model Law’s legislative history for enacting 
states to unwaveringly defer to foreign avoidance law.190 Rather, 
the spirit of the Model Law is for enacting states to incorporate 
Article 23 as they deem fit.191 Whereas, Congress did just that—
made policy choices in enacting Chapter 15—those choices 
should be preserved. 
CONCLUSION 
As transnational business becomes more pervasive, cross-
border insolvencies will also increase. Thus, there are certain to 
be future occasions when non-US insolvencies will petition for 
Chapter 15 recognition and seek to commence an avoidance 
action in the United States. To ensure that case law regarding 
                                                                                                                                                                     
186. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (showing that each country has 
different avoidance laws consistent with its national policies). 
187. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (explaining that Model Law 
Article 23’s purpose is to preserve some form of avoidance relief for insolvency 
representatives, but that it does not define any parameters of that relief or specify issues 
regarding choice of law). 
188. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (discussing when the law of 
the debtor’s COMI is displaced in an EU avoidance action). 
189. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (setting forth the EU 
Regulation’s general choice of law rule in avoidance actions). 
190.  See supra notes 54, 89–90 (explaining that Chapter 15 is based on the Model 
Law, which was based on the EU Regulation). 
191.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that enacting states 
incorporate the Model Law in a manner consistent with their national policies). 
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cross-border avoidance actions develops in a manner consistent 
with the intentions of Chapter 15, courts should not rely on 
Condor. 
Condor is inconsistent with Chapter 15 because it ignores 
§ 1523’s requirement and misapprehends the purposes of 
§ 1521. It also espouses a choice of law rule that is inconsistent 
with established US choice of law jurisprudence. Going forward, 
courts faced with Chapter 15 petitions seeking avoidance relief 
should embrace § 1523 as the only governing provision for 
avoidance actions and require that all such actions be brought 
through a plenary proceeding under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code. At that time, courts should look to Maxwell in 
their choice of law determinations. 
 
